Considering the discussion at the roundtable, the delegates’ submissions, as well as the panellist’s presentation, several points emerge: (1) Environmental objectives, taxonomy, and historical practices govern much of the law and regulation that applies to the waste sector, including the management of municipal solid waste (2) Collection of MSW is a natural monopoly under many, though not all, circumstances. Several empirical studies indicate that costs increase when more than one collector is used. Nevertheless, there are countries where there is competition in the market. (“MSW”). Although these regulations constrain the conduct of the firms operating in this sector, competition can nevertheless be relied upon to provide incentives for efficiency. Competition authorities’ advocacy can help to ensure that law(3) (3) The benefits of competition for the short-term legal monopoly to supply collection and disposal services can be harmed by poor design of the tender. Two particular concerns are competitive non-neutrality and not taking into account the essentiality of disposal services for collectors. (4) Markets for collection and disposal tend to be geographically small. Nevertheless restrictions on disposal can harm competition among disposal options. Excess entry into incineration can divert recyclable waste from a higher rank on the waste hierarchy and can cause plants to operate below capacity, thus raising the cost of incineration. (5) Excess entry into incineration can divert recyclable waste from a higher rank on the waste hierarchy and can cause plants to operate below capacity, thus raising the cost of incineration. Entry into incineration depends in part on public subsidies. State aid decisions should take better account of conditions in relevant markets, as well as in related markets, such as those for alternative management of waste, to ensure overall efficiency. (6) The great variety of local solutions to MSW management as well as differences among competition authorities’ treatment of particular conduct in this sector make it difficult for companies to formulate strategies that comply across the large number of jurisdictions where they are active. (7) The conduct of extended producer responsibility schemes (”PRS”) affects competition in markets for the services they buy, such as collection and treatment, and in markets for certain waste materials, as well as competition among PRSs themselves. Competitive tendering, limits on exclusivity agreements, and limits on tying and bundling are often imposed to reduce the harm to competition.