Under the Extended Producer Responsibility Act, this paper develops Nash game models to optimize remanufacturing and pricing strategies for two brands (namely, and ) of a product whose manufacturers compete in a duopoly market. We contribute to the literature by the simultaneous consideration of the external competition between two brands and the internal competition between new and remanufactured products. It is assumed that , having a greater customer acceptance level in terms of the new products, is willing to do remanufacturing of its high-quality used products. However, the customers' acceptance level of the remanufactured products might be more or less than that of the new products. As in practice, the volume of remanufactured products is not allowed to exceed that of its high-quality used products. The results show that the profits of manufacturer are lesser under the remanufacturing case. Also, when the acceptance level of new B2 is more than that of the remanufactured products, with a reduction in the acceptance level of the remanufactured products, the profits of two manufacturers will increase.