Implementation of the extended producer responsibility (EPR) is a key way to promote manufacturers to participate actively in collection and remanufacturing activities. Under the conditions of adverse selection as well as moral hazard, taking the remanufacturing rate and the effort extent of manufacturer as the asymmetric information, the incentive contract between the government and the manufacturer was designed. Based on the proposed incentive contract, the realistic conditions for monotone hazard rate of manufacturer's profit and implementation of government's positive incentive were provided. The relation-ships between parameters and government's subsidy-tax contract were analyzed. The influences of various factors at different stages of EPR implementation to the government's expected revenue were discussed. The results indicate that, the proposed contract is effective to achieve the manufacturers' high-validity motivation and effort-extent excitation, as well as to improve government's revenue. The conclusions are helpful to the design of government's environmental regulation and the operation of manufacturers under the EPR system.