考虑生产者延伸责任制度在我国再制造产业的实施,构建由一位制造商与一位再制造商组成的闭环供应链动态博弈模型,以成员企业的回收努力水平、废旧产品购买量、产品产量等为决策要素,分别探讨无政府参与的自由回收、基于回收率奖惩的政府规制以及政府规制下的基金调控3种模式下制造商与再制造商的最优决策,分析政府规制与基金调控对企业决策和环境绩效的影响.研究表明:制造商的回收策略与废旧产品的转移价格密切相关;基于回收率奖惩的政府规制对回收再制造活动具有积极的推进作用;再制造基金调控在一定程度上能够激励再制造商提高生产能力,有利于专业分工局面的形成,但不适于在再制造产业成熟阶段实施.研究结论对生产者延伸责任制度下企业再制造策略选择、政府环境规制设计具有一定的参考价值.[Considering the concept of extended producer responsibility (EPR) along with government intervention of remanufacturing industry in China, the game between manufacturers and remanufacturers is investigated using a closed-loop supply chain dynamic game model. The recovery effort, the purchase amount of end-of-life products, and product output of channel members are defined as decision elements in the model for three scenarios, including independent recovery without government intervention, government regulated recovery contingent on reward-penalty measures, and government-regulated recovery dependent upon fund coordination. Equilibrium solutions of the members are approximated in three contexts, respectively, to expound how government regulation and fund coordination affect corporate strategies and environmental performance. The results indicate that the recovery strategy of the manufacturer is most relevant to the transfer payment of end-of-life products, government regulations contingent on reward-penalty measures facilitates the progress of recycling and remanufacturing operations, and fund coordination in some extent stirs production capacity enhancement of the remanufacturer and promotes specialization however lacks practicability for the well-developed remanufacturing industry. The results are concluded of significant references for corporates in remanufacturing strategy selections and government in environmental regulation design based on the EPR system.]