Publication type: Academic Journal Article
Using a vintage durable good model, this paper investigates how extended producer responsibility (EPR) in waste management influences product durability and welfare. Four EPR instruments are discussed and compared with the benchmark in which producers do not receive price signals for waste disposal. In each case, EPR induces durability to increase. Under perfect competition the welfare change caused by EPR is unambiguously positive and one EPR instrument is even capable of implementing the first-best welfare optimum. In contrast, under imperfect competition EPR may lead to a welfare reduction. The analysis also compares EPR to non-EPR measures.
This website provides reference information on reports, articles, and other publications related to EPR. Where possible, links to the original source are provided. Copies of the actual publications are not maintained in the reference database because the publications may be copyrighted or otherwise protected by the publishing source or author. Follow the link to the original document and/or contact the publisher/author for more information.