Extended producer responsibility (EPR) is an important tool to develop a circular economy and construct the ecological civilization. An increasing amount of countries manage municipal solid waste through EPR systems to fight environmental pollution. It is of great significance to explore the EPR systems that are suitable for China’s situation, building on foreign advanced experiences. This paper presents a tripartite game model to explore the strategy selection of producers, recyclers, and the government, as well as the mechanisms of implementation of an EPR system in China, and its influencing factors. The results demonstrate that: (i) eight evolutionary stable strategies emerge in the implementation of the EPR system. (ii) the strategy selection of producers largely depends on the difference between payoffs and costs related to the EPR system. (iii) contract signature is a helpful way to limit the “free-riding” behavior of stakeholders. (iv) producers can cooperate with multiple recyclers to disperse the risk caused by their opportunity cost. All these factors need to be considered in the implementation of EPR regulation, and to construct a complete system of waste recycling and utilization.