An EPR policy places some responsibility for a product’s end-of-life impacts on the original producer Since the term “extended producer responsibility” was first coined and the German packaging take-back law was passed in the early 1990s, the EPR concept has become an established principle of environmental policy in many countries. Although EPR means slightly different things to different people, a core characteristic of any EPR policy is that it places some responsibility for a product’s end-of-life environmental impacts on the original producer and seller of that product. The thinking behind this approach is that it will provide incentives for producers to make design changes to products that would reduce waste management costs. Those changes should include improving product recyclability and reusability, reducing material usage and downsizing products, and engaging in a host of other socalled “design for environment” (DfE) activities. The extent to which EPR policies lead to DfE is an open question. Much that is written on the topic seems to take it on faith that any form of producer responsibility will provide DfE incentives, but there is very little careful conceptual thinking on how such incentives work through the system and sparse documentation of real-world changes that have been made in response to policies. This study partially fills this gap. The study begins by describing the policy instruments that lie under the EPR umbrella. These include different types of product fees and taxes commonly called “advance recycling fees” (ARFs), product take-back mandates, virgin material taxes, and combinations of these instruments. EPR instruments are contrasted with non-EPR policies such as “pay-asyou-throw” waste collection charges, landfill bans, and others. It is argued that a cost-effective instrument will be one that exploits all the possible avenues for waste reduction – i.e., source reduction, recycling, material substitution, and product design changes – and not just a single method. This means that policy options such as a combined ARF/recycling subsidy work better than an instrument that just targets, say, recycling. The take-back option is difficult to evaluate conceptually since much depends on how it is implemented in practice. All systems operate with producer responsibility organizations (PROs), and the financing mechanism that the PRO uses is a critical determinant of the option’s cost-effectiveness. The study also discusses issues of transaction costs and the administrative feasibility of some of the instruments and includes a brief discussion of individual versus collective arrangements in take-back programs. Some instruments that seem to more directly target DfE – take-back without a PRO, for example, and product fees and subsidies that vary by recyclability or some other product characteristic – are likely to be very difficult and costly to design, implement, and enforce. Their greater ability to spur DfE must be weighed against these added costs. A combination of an Advance Recycling Fee and a recycling subsidy would be economically efficient Several studies by economists have argued the merits of the combined ARF/recycling subsidy approach. The study summarizes a recent analysis that incorporates product design choices in the theoretical model and that confirms this policy option as an economically efficient one. When combined with a modest waste disposal fee, the ARF/recycling subsidy can achieve the socially optimal level of waste disposal, recycling, and product recyclability. The latter half of the study turns to some real-world examples of EPR policies and evaluates them in terms of recycling outcomes achieved and, to the extent possible, DfE results. The policies include a combined ARF/recycling subsidy program for used oil in western Canada; a take-back program for packaging in the U.K. that includes an innovative tradable recycling credit scheme; and two more traditional take-back programs for waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), one in the Netherlands and one in Korea. This section concludes with some additional remarks on the much-discussed German packaging program and new laws covering motor vehicles.